Ithe philosophy of Being and NOlhingness and should prevent us also from lattempting to isolate the philosophical matter from the personal self-reflection. First, the Diaries testify absolutely to the fact that Sartre's initial intention was 10 work out an ethies; tbe ontology was aneillary so far as his original purpose was eoncemed. Second, the project to formulate amoral theory was, in Sartre's mind, inextricably bound up witb his seareb for authentie personal morality to serve as a guide for bis own life. I will speak briefly about the first point and then more at length regarding the second.
In early December Sartre writes to Beauvoir that he has been thinking about ethical questions since his mobilization in September. Now, he says, "I have seen that ethics which 1 have been practicing for three months without making a theory out of it-quite contrary to my usual habit. " (I. p. 455) He goes on to quote to her from a passage he had just written in the Diaries. In tbe letter he adds, "All of this naturally revolves around ideas about freedom, life, and authenticity. " A bit later Sartre teils Beauvoir that he has worked out a metaphysies wbich is a natural accompaniment for his ethics. At this stage he uses ·metaphysies, " not "ontology" for his own theory, apparently because he wanted to contrast it with the philosophy of Husserl and of Heidegger.
Wha' we wise little phenomenologisla were doing up till now was ontology. You searched for the eascnce of consciouanesl with Husserl or for the being of exislents with Heidegger. Dut melaphysica ia an wOnlic. WYou pUl your handl in the dough. You no longer abißt about essences (which givea an eidetic-sciencea of poaaiblca-or an onlology) but of aetua. eonefCle, liven exiatcncel, and you alk why it ia like thai. Thia is what the Greek philosophen were up lo-there ia a sun, why il the a sun? Instead of "Wbat ia the essence of an pOlsible auna, solar eaaence?W Or WWhat ia the being of sun?" (0. pp. [49] [50] Sartre is not after questions of origin; of course. The ·why· questions he will raise will be answered by a description of the purposive activity of an individual .consciousness in the everyday world. Laler in Being and Nothingness he wisely, I think, realized th~t ontology was what he was doing after all, and he allocated to metaphysics only hypothetical though legitimate speculation as to the probable evolution of consciousness and the Iike. In 1940 he worried for a while lest what he was offering was warmed over Heidegger, but this doubt was quickly dispelled. He wrote to Beauvoir, "I believe that what I am doing is interesting and new; it bears no resemblance to HusserI's philosophy nor to Heidegger's nor to anybody's. Rather it would represent all my old ideas on perception and existence, ideas stillbom for lack of any technique but ideas which I can now develop with alJ of phenomenologicaJ and existentialist technique. " (11. p. 51)
Three days later Sartre pinpointed the unifying element in his metaphysics.
1 am retaining all of Husserl'. beina-in-the-world, and yet 1 arrive at an absolute neo-realism (in which 1 integrate Gestalt theory). The Diaries show that Sartre developed bis crucial concept of Neanl in reaction to and against Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's use of the notion of anguish or dread at nothing and Heidegger's description of the world as suspended in nothingness. The old stillbom ideas presumably refer to his student interest in contingency and to the view of consciousness as a void in being, which Sartre mentioned in a letter he wrote in 1925. 3 The concept of Nothingness as a lack in the very being of consciousness Sartre held to be the decisive cleavage between himself and his predecessors as weil as the unifying foundation of his own philosophy. I made everything fall into place. Quotations chosen almost at random from a single passage in the Diaries show this centripetal force in action.
2nte published French text reads evenemenl, and the nolion of the emergence of consciousness with its nothingness as an evcnt that happens to Beinl is orthodox Sartre. I wonder, however, if the manuscript might possibly have read evenlemenl, an airing or ventilation (i.e., an emptincls) .t the healt of being, which would, Ilhink, fit his thought at this stage even better. And SO on in terms by now familiar to all of uso Here Sartre bas ancbored his metaphysics in tbe stream of existential-pbenomenology. Some pages earlier be bad arrived at the view of a nihilating, self-making consciousness via the traditional ethical concems of self-fulfillment, value, and responsibility. I will quote a few illustrative sentences:
An elhics i. a system of ends. Then 10 what end oughl human reality 10 acl? Thc only aOlwer: to itself al end. . . . An end can bc po.itcd only by a bcing which il ita own poaaibilitics; that ia, which projCCla itaelf lOward thCIC pouibililiel in thc future ... . Human realily ia of an existentill typc lUch thal ita exillellCe conatitutea it in the fonn of a value to be realized by ita freedom.... [lt) exi.ta a. a plan for itaelf [a desse;n de so;). 11 is this self. . . . (al that which awaita it in the future to bc realized by ita freedom) which ia value. There exista no other value than human realily from its plan. Withoul the world, no value. Eabica ia a Ipecifically human thing; it would have 00 meaning for angela or for God.... [Human realily) motivatc. itaelfwithout being ita own foundatioo. What we caU ill freedom ia the facllhat it ia never anything without motivating itaclf to be it. Nothing can ever happen to it from outside. . . . The fact that there is a conaciousncss which motivates ita own structure is irreducible aod absurd. (C, pp. 136-139. WO, I desist at tbis point. To summarize the philosophical content of the Diaries would be to outline Being anti NOlhingness. Indeed at one time Sartre thought he might excerptthese passages for separate publication. They lack the closely reasoned argument to support certain of bis conclusions; for example, the attempt in the Introduction of Being and NOlhingness to prove that his view of consciousness avoids the pitfalls of botb idealism and realism. And tbe diseussion of bad faith was in one of the missing notebooks for January. But most of the later work is there and not just in embryo. Wbat we have is elose to a condensed first draft 4 except for tbe intrusion of details of army Iife, autobiographical material, and personal introspection. The last two, while extraneous to Being and Nothingness, in one sense, are directly relevant in another, for they show Sartre in the process of formulating theories to explain what he had observed in bis own and other' behavior, thereby shedding light on his intentions in the later work. The ties to its author are no longer obvious in the way that they are in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, for example, but they were there at the start. Virtually everything in Being a,uI Nothingness ean be shown to be rooted in the autobiographical refections, but I will concentrate here on two major themes in the Diaries-authenticity and love.
Authenticity
Authenticity is not a key concept in Being and Nothingness; it is partially replaced by the notion of good faith, but even this is more implied tban diseussed. Authenticity is a central idea in the Diar;es. It is the goal of Sartre's moral theory. He speaks of it as a "metaphysical value," the "only absolute, " and he offers ethics based on it as the sole alternative to moral codes founded on duty, resignation, or complacency. I think the case can be made that it is equivalent to what Sartre later called good faith; if so, he regarded it as both possible and difficult. In the Diar;es Sartre sought to achieve~authentieity personally while trying to explain it philosophically. He encountered pitfalls in both pursuits.
Sartre's notion of authenticity embraced two not entirely compatible sets of ideas, one deriving from the earlier preoccupationsthat had culminated in The Transcendence 0/the Ego, the other leading him to break new ground. In each ease be approaches a positive view after considering fonns of its opposite, inauthenticity. Sartre's first discussion of inauthenticity is applied Heidegger. He amuses himself by describing his companion Pieter as an "angel of inauthenticity" who exemplifies perfectly the avoidance of personal responsibility by taking refuge in the social, impersonal "one" or das Mall that the ego is the construct of consciousness, not part of its structure, and he wants to live this detachment as openness to change. He does, to be sure, speak of a -fidelity to self, -but this means simply that he will not He to bimself. Stoics, he points out, seek to gain equanimity by demeaning the object which might cause them griefe But Sartre, when he jealously fears that he has lost bis current love, Tania, to someone else, admits to bimself that he would be deprived of something precious. -Authenticity demands that we be a little tearfuU-(C, p. 69. WD, p. 51) Yet in a half-serious statement to Beauvoir Sartre remarkS that it is hard for him to be authentic since he clings so closelY to bis love for her. (11. p. 76) Tbe fact is that for a time Sartre identified authenticity with pure, unreflective spontaneity in wbicb one was caugbt up entirely in immediate feeling. And since be feit incapable of letting bimself go in this way, he concluded that he was not autbentic. By some strange reversal Sartre, wbile retaining bis belief that consciousness is not identical with the ego, feit that bis awareness of this basic freedom precluded authenticity. The latter required that one be wholly given to an experience whereas the price of freedom was that one is always outside. (C, p. 405. WD, p. 334) He writes, It'. tNe, I am not authentic. With everythin,l feell know that I feel it even before feelinl it. And then, wholly occupied with defininl it and thinkin. it, I no IonIer more than halfway feel it. My ,reateat pauions are ooly nervoul impulses. The reit of the time I hasten over my feeling, then I develop it in WOrdl, I prell a little here, I force a little there, aOO behold an exemplary constNcaed feelinl fit to be inserted
Sartre goes on to say that tbis sort of exploitative self-sclUtiny is his most basic reality, and he is a bit weary of it. We might be inclined to dismiss tbis kind of thing as typical of writers, but Sartre, who sounds this note witb distressing frequency, alternates between the conviction that something is missing in him (a view that is certainly not consistent with his philosophy) and the idea that he is somehow not authentically realizing himself as a spontaneous, nonreflective consciousness.
Influenced by such feelings, Sartre played an unadmirable part in a most unsavoury episode. Passing judgement on himself afterward, he said that it was out of this experience that he developed his theory of authenticity, obviously seeing in his own behavior a negative example. (Lettres, II. p. 131) But it was the unfamiliar satisfaction of feeling strongly and acting recklessly in the face of all cautionary reflection that 100 him more and more deeply into it, as though he took delight in doing what he condemned. The incident reads like a travesty of bis later practice of thinking against himself. The full story of what happened is in the letters to Beauvoir, to whom Sartre regularly confided the troubles encountered in his "contingent" love affairs with other women: the Diaries also make cryptic reference to it. Briefly, the crisis was precipitated when Martine Bourdin, witb whom Sartre bad enjoyed a prolonged affair same months earlier, showOO some of his love letters to a male acquaintance of Sartre's new mistress, Tania. Martine had addOO an unflattering oral description of Sartre's sexual practices, and all of this had been relayed to Tania, who now not only feit that she had been betrayOO but lookOO on Sartre, as he bimself expressed it, as "an obscene goat." (C, p. 295. WD, p. 242) Parenthetically, I note that Sartre's shockOO realization of how he appearOO to others, his confused sense of irremOOiably having to recognize that he was this self that others saw while at the same time he was free to not be it-all this must certainly have contributed to the devastating look described in Being and Nothingness. But what concems me here is Sartre's own action and the attitude he took toward it. Furious with Martine, he wrote a letter to her in which he repainted the history of bis entire relation with her in the most disgusting tenns. This letter he sent to Tania, asking her to read it and then mail it on to Martine. Even that request was in bad faith, for Sartre thought that Tania would find reasons not to do so, and he profoundly hoped that she would not. Later he condemnOO his conduct in the harshest tenns. "I am very thoroughly disgustOO with myself." (11. p. 92) "I very profoundly and sincerely feel myself to be un salaud." (11. p. 94) Yet his regret is tinged with a kind of wistful pride that he had been able to commit the infamy. The night that he wrote the letter to Martine, he recordOO in his diary, "This evening (after a few Iibations, it must be said) I was gripped by a kind of 99 rapture atthe idea of defending so just a cause. What has seduced me here is the idea of action." (C, p. 285. WD, p. 242) Action, he observes, which as usual used words as its instrument. Five days later he writes to Beauvoir, The letter to Bourdin was abjecl. I ageee completel)'. But )'ou do not know lhe kind of rlsping jo)' I found in being enough outaide of m)'sclf 10 do • filth)' thing. I have often been a stinker negligentl)' and frivoloual)', but I have never done the kind of absolute dirt)' trick that the sending of that letter represcnta. Up until now I have alwa)'s been to cold to do it. (11. p. lOS)
To me this episode demonstrates the bankruptcy of the attempt to equate authenticity with spontaneous action motivated purely by immediate desire. Some persons, only superficially acquainted with Sartre's ideas, have indeed tried to define authenticity as the decision to do that which one absolutely and arbitrarily wants to do. lronically, Sartre has fumished his own example to seem to support this charge and the pejorative judgement on Sartre that usually accompanies it. Whether he specifically had tbis negative conclusion in mind when he said that it was out of this experience that he developed his theory of authenticity, I do not know. I suspect that he referred also to other positive conclusions which were more far-reacbing ihan resolutions for his personal Iife-although related to them. I believe that when he told Beauvoir that henceforth he wanted to care more deeply about things and to take on responsibility for seeing them through, he was drawing on reßections not connected exclusively with the recent crisis but deriving from a second set of associations with authenticity which he had been working through, those placing value not on spontaneity, but on responsibility.
Having introduced the preceding discussion with Sartret s portrait of Pieter, I turned now to his analysis of another of his comrades, the inauthentic Paul. Paul had remarked, "Me, a soldier? I consider myself a civilian in military disguise." Sartre comments, This would be .11 very weil if he were not making himaelf. soldier, deapite his resentment, b)' his volitions, his perceptionl, his emotionl. A soldier: that meana taking on the responsibilit)' for carrying out the orden of his auperion, an accomplice down to his anna which carry the riße, hil legs which march, • soldier in hil perceptions, his emotions, hia volitions. Thercforc he penilll in fieeing what he ia making himself, and this plungea him into a slate of miserable, diffuse anguiah. There is some indication tbat tbis portrait of Paul is also a retrospective self-portrait by Sartre.
He introduces the example of Paul in presenting the view that consciousness, as a lack of heing, realizes its existence as the activity of making itself bei consequently consciousness is self-motivating, must provide its own self-justification. But "it is so difficult to live without heing in any way justified." (C, p. 87. WD, p. 65) The need to make oneselfbe and weariness at perpetual responsibility go hand-in-hand. ODe may take refuge in either of two inauthentic attitudes. One may feel that freedom is simply swallowed up in facticity, that one is a victim of circumstances, a consciousness buffeted by external pressures like a piece of wood tossed about by the ocean waves. Or, like Paul, one may deny the connection between consciousness' judgement and one's facticity. Without using the term, Sartre has described the mechanism of bad faith as playing on the two meanings of the verb to he, as failing to acknowledge our existence as both facticity and transcendence. (C, p. 142. WD, pp. 111-112)
Sartre points out that in someone (bimself, perhaps, but not Paul) the anxiety stemming from his unacknowledged realization of a contradiction in his basic hehavior rnight serve as a motive for a conversion to authenticity. what would such a conversion be? ODe must suppress the flight. ODe must assume the situation in which one finds oneself. To assume is not the same as to accept.
Sartre has no use for Nietzsche's amor lat;, which he considers just another variation on bad faith. To assume is to take to one's account, to be responsible for, to admit that whatever one is or does, one is without excuse. In words virtually copied in Being anti NOlhingness, Sartre shows how the war that comes is my war, etc.
But if authenticity is a vatue, it is not primary. It appears as a response to, and in the context of, the fundamental search for the value of substantiality, of existing as self-eause, what Sartre later callsthe desire to be God. Human reality can no more discontinue the quest to be its own foundation, Sartre says, than a cognitive consciousness can cease to posit the world. But it is possible to carry on the quest authentically; one must "assume what one founds. If the aet of founding is prior to the existent that one founds, as in the case of creation, the assumption is contained apriori in the act of founding. An example here would be the South African who must decide what role he/she will assume in the racial conflict for wbich he/she is responsible even though not persooally the initiator. Or we might cite Sartrets OWD example from the Crilique, the French colon in Algena who must intemali~as part of bis project the exploitative structure of the practico-inert laid down by earlier generations.
At the end of Being and NOlhingness, of course, Sartre implies that it might be possible to live without the value of tbe self-eause and to substitute freedom in its place. In the Diaries be seems to limit bimself to the view presented in the section 00 "Domg and Having, " in Being antI NOlhingnas: that one must pursue the self-eause, that to achieve it symbolically in various forms of creating or appropriating is what provides concrete satisfaction in life, that the varying ways io which one pursues it color and define the human person, and that such pursuit is in DO way to determine, hence to destroy, freedom but rather to realize its possibilities. In short, it is not the pursuit which is inauthentic but the belief that one has reached the goal and need pursue no further.
In a later passage Sartre states that to be authentie is to call into question. "And itts not enough to call into question; you must change.· (C, p. 269. WD, p. 221) We note that autbenticity continues to require a willingness to break with onets past, to effect a radical cooversion of onets projects and onets conduct.
On the other hand, what Sartre says toward the end on the Diar;es shows that he no longer views authenticity as pure spontaneity or detachment as such. "eastor correctly writes to me that genuine authenticity does not consist in overflowing one's life on all sides, or in witbdrawing so as to judge it, or in liberating oneself from it at every instant, but 00 tbe contrary, in plunging into it and making yourself part of it." (C, p. 356. WD, p. 293). In place of this freedom suspended in air he believes not that one ought to put down roots.
"Personality ought to bave a conlenl. It should be made of clay, and It m made of wind."
The full implications of the metaphor may be seen in another passage io which Sartre compares himself to Katow, a character in Malraux's The Human Condilion, wbo wheo laken prisoner, gives away the cyanide wbicb he had counted 00 to protect hirn from torture.
It seem~to me that at that moment he is genuinely human reality beeause nothing holds him outside of the world; he i. fully within it, free and defenseless. The movement from absolute freedom to a diaarmed, human freedom, the rejeetion of the poison [i.e., Sartre'. delaehment) ha. been effected for me thi. year and by the same stroke, I now envi.ion my destiny al jinile. And Like his character Mathieu, Sartre has at last discovered that freedom must engage itself. A philosophical change has accompanied the moral development. By now Sartre has concluded that individual character is not a deterministic structure but is identical with the individual project. Instead of bestowing all importance on pre-reflective consciousness, he recognizes the significance of the ego as the object indication of what the for-itself has made of itself by inscribing its being in the world. If the ego is the product of consciousness, it has at least the value of a creative work in which extemal ingredients display the starnp of consciousness.
Sartre attributes his awakening to Heidegger and to the war which taugbt him the vulnerability of his concrete project. I think of the episode which I mentioned earlier played apart as weil. Writing to Beauvoir after tbe event, Sartre says that he feels sullied [saU] by it. He adds, "I thought that Dothing could ever sully me, and I perceive that bis is not true." (11. p. 95) It was not only the war that made inroads on his protective isolation.
In a kind of postscript to his reflections on authenticity, Sartre asked himself whether his new view of engagement might entrap hirn in the spirit of seriousness. With relief he quickly concluded that to make oneself aperson did not mean to give oneselfthe "coagulated consciousness" ofthe serious man. The spirit of seriousness assigns more reality to the world than to oneself and measures one's own reality in terms of the world. But one is still a consciousness. And "it is not possible to apprehend oneself as a consciousness without thinking that Iife is agame." Sartre sums up in a reconciling statement.
To grasp oneself as a person is the very opposite of grasping oneself in terms of the world. However authentie you are, you are nonetheless free-even more free than in the ease of the ivory tower sinee you are eondemned to a freedom without a shadow and without exculC.... In renouncing the ivory tower t I would like the world to appear to mc in ill full, threatening reality, but for aU that, I dontt want my life to cease to be agame. That t , why laubacribe entirely 10 Schillert, ,taternent: "Man i, fully man when he i, playing." (C t pp. 396-397. WO, p. 327)
Apparently now Sartre feels that one must play for higher stakes and be willing to abide by the roles one lays down.
But what about eoneern for the other players? In the real world one cannot play solitaire. For a time it was as if Sartre tried to do so and saw others ehiefly as obstacles on the path to authentieity. It is elearly something of tbis kind that he has in mind when he coneludes woefully that he had not been authentie when on.Ieave in Paris and that it is easier to be authentie in wartime than in peaee.
Sartre considers the example of the soldier who has chosen to be authentie and then is visited by his wife. He will aet differently in his relation with her because he is different. Butthere will be a problem. Tbe one who bas been expecting to fmd the inauthentie in us will "freeze us to the marrow by reawakening our old live. This is an imposed inauthenticity against which it is easy but painful to defend ourselves." (C, p. 270. WD, p. 221) In tbis context Sartre's comments seem to me to point even beyond Being and NOlhingness and to state the thesis of the Crilique. Resistance to the resolve to live authentically does not eome from residues of inauthentieity left like patcbes of dirt on an ill-dusted surface. It is simply that earlier relationships and prior situations resist change like things. "They have become inslilulions. " They take on permanence and even evolve outside the person. "These revolutionary ehanges wbicb are translated into a stroggle against the solidity of institutions are not different in nature from the ehanges that a politician wants to bring to social institutions, and they eneounter tbe same resistances. " (C, p. 269. WD, p. 221) The unity between the early and the late Sartre is already apparent.
Love
At a moment of depression Sartre declared that bis relations with others were "an open wound." (C, p. 302. WO, p. 248) The section on relations with others, in the Diaries, though brief, is very close to the chapter on "Concrete Relations with Others" in Being and NOlhingness, conceptually and even verbally. It centers on love as the project of wanting to be loved. He says explieitly that tbis is only one way of loving and that it is inauthentic. (C, p. 314. WD, p. 25~) He adds, "I have painted myself to the Iife in this metaphysical description." (C, p. 318. WD, p. 261) And he provides an autobiographical narrative to attach his own experience even more closely to the preceding discussion. Yet while disavowing any attempt to describe all kinds of love or even love as such, Sartre lays claim to some universality in his portrayal of one of its unauthentic forms. His introductory statement makesthis clear. "In every imperialistic feeling Iike mine, there is some sort of inauthenticity. But we must understand what that means. 1 am struck this morning by that universal demand: to want 'to be loved. ''' (C, p. 310. WD, p. 255 ). Sartre's explanation of why the lover wants to be loved follows along Iines familiar to us. Love is not a project of enslavement. ODe doesn't want to be loved by an automaton or by an Isolde-Iike victim of chemistry, nor by aperson dutifully fulfilling a pledge to love. Then Sartre moves into the personal. Obviously Sartre does not mean to resort to physical violence or mental cruelty Iike the sadist. But his goal is perilously close to that of the sadist; it is that previous moment when the beloved victim consents to self-surrender. This inauthentic love, which Sartre openly labeled as a project of seduction, held the same aim as all other forms of inauthenticity-the sense that one's existence is justified-in this instance because the other finds one to be absolutely necessary for her being.
1 do not wish to dweil, as Sartre does, on the detailed history of tbis not very elevating enterprise and will confine myself to a fewobservations. First, I note that Sartre wrote these entries exaclly at the same time that he was caught up in the epis<rle involving Martine and Taoia, which had plunged hirn into an unaccustomed seif-questioning with respect to his relations with others. In a letter to Beauvoir, he remarked that it was his project of seduction that led hirn to form relations which were not truly meaningful to him. Second, the distinctively Sartrean style of seduction involves personal characteristics which Sartre does not hold to be universal, and wbich, except for a faint echo, do not appear in Being and NOlhingness. (I refer here to the statement that the lover seeks to captivate the beloved by making bimself a fascinating object and the linking of love and language.) Sartre's means were entirely verbal. This was partly, he says, because he feit bimselfto be ugly. Indeed he remarks that part of his unending pursuit of wornen was so that he might possess vicariously the beauty that he lacked-still another form of appropriation. Partly, also, he took pleasure in bis own verbal performance. He actually campares bis seductive activity with writing and calls each attempt a ·whole Iiterary labor.· Through words he tumed an occurrence into a work of art, mush as Roquentin (in Nausea) tried to create an adventure out of bis past experience.S But whereas Roquentin realized that he had to choose between Iiving and telling, Sartre made
ODe the means of the other. More closely linked with the lover in Being and NOlhingness, is bis statement that through words he wanted to interpose bimself as the indispensable intermediary between the woman and the world. In the Diaries Sartre expresses horror at the way he had actually tried to steal from the woman her own way of looking at the world and to replace her perceptions and feelings with his OWD. And he recognizes that he had regarded each woman as raw material to be molded into a form in which he as creator might fmd his image in the work he had created. Finally, 1 would say, Sartre's self-portrait of bimself as seducer, combines the two attitudes toward the Other which is Being anti NOlhingness he so carefully distinguished. This is not surprising since he makes tbe point that one is Iikely to slip from one attitude to the other and back again; in all forms of bad faith there tends to be a vacillation between the denial of transcendence and the denial of facticity; the subject-object contlict is only a particular exemplification.
To do Sartre credit, he concludes bis description with tbe statement that be not only feels disgust retrospectively at this kind of behavior on his part but realizes that he bad feit it all along, but bad hidden tbe feeling from himself by SIn Ibia connection Sartre makea an amuainl rcfercnce 10 a failure. -For my seduction • relied .olelyon my apeaking .
• still remember my embarraumcnt in Berlin. I had set out rclOlved 10 know Gennan women, but in a mon time I rcalized that I did not know eooulh Gennan to converae. Stripped of my weapon, I remained quile atupid and did not darc to atlempt anything. I had to fall back on a French woman.· satisfaetion at hi~eonquests. Refreshingly he adds that althoughit had never oeeurred to hirn at the time, tbe women might have been playing the same eomedy, casting him in the reverse role.
The Diaries should put to rest forever the often beard argument thatthe section ealled "Conerete Relations with Others" in Being anti Nothingness describes love as it is essentially and inevitably. Yet despite Sartre's statement in the Diaries that "there are other ways of loving," (C, p. 314. WD, p. 258) he does not describe them. At no point does he even raise the question of the nature of authentie love. He does, however, make same positive assertions about the nature of friendship, wbieb indicate the possibility of relations in good faith. Even more important, there is the fact of his relation with Simone de Beauvoir. If we supplement the Diaries with material from the Letters, we see Sartre sustaining an entirely different kind of love relation, one whieh he unquestionably regarded as enduring and authentie. It is generally not eonsidered fair to derive a man's theory from his practice, let alone from his love letters, and especially if he is a philosopher. But given the intent of this paper, I want to do something of the sort, partly so as not to leave the impression that Sartre's emotional Iife was Iimited to what he himself denouneed as utterly inauthentie, if not worse.
In the Diaries Sartre is naturally more reserved, but what he says is signifieant. Only at one point does he even slightly suggest that he ever tried to subject Beauvoir to his usual project of seduetion, and what he says here is aeeompanied by a rueful reflection on himself. Confessing that part of his line with a woman was first to warn her that she must never try to eneroaeh on his freedom and then grandly to proclaim that he gave it to her as a gift, fully expecting he would easily get it back from her, Sartre writes, "Onee I was eaught at my own game. Castor aeeepted this freedom and kept. . . . I was fool enough to be upset by that. Instead of eomprehending my extraordinary good luek, I fell into a sort of depression." (C, p. 111. WD, p. 85) Castor pulled.him out of his silly belief in salvation by arte (C, p. 102. WD, p. 78) And more than onee, "Castor was right when she said, ... "
The letters eould weil support a full and riehly rewarding exploration of the nature of the Sartre-Beauvoir relationship, far beyond the scope of a single paper. Here I can only summarize and highlight the most obvious relevant points.
To start witb, the avid desire to share every detail and mood of each day, simply for the pleasure of leaming or telling one another testifies to the deepest mutual concern and to their will to have their lives thoroughly intermingled. It is accompanied by a genuine wish for criticism from one another and willingness to modify action in response to it. (For example, wben Beauvoir adversely criticized a long prologue Sartre bad enthusiastically written for bis novel trilogy, he jettisoned it, gratefully.) When he writes that their love is 'the only achieved success in bis Iife, a ·perfection and arepose,· (I. p. 314) that whatever good there is in him is due to her, (I. p. 359) we may sOOle at a lover's exaggeration. But when he teils her repeatedly that she is the only honesty of bis life, bis ·moral consciousness,· his ·witness· and his ·judge,· the '''consistence of this person,· bis ·other self,· I think we are readmg the troe signs of how Sartre Iivedthis relationship. Sartre told Beauvoir that the war had made him even more foreefully aware of how much she meant to hirn, of the irreducible and incomparable value of their love. Clearly tbe distasteful episode involving Tania 'and Martine also served as a revealing catharsis. Before it was over, he lived it as a crisis in his relations with Beauvoir, ODe evoked solely by his fear that if she saw him as he now looked on himself, some irreparable hann might have been done. I join rny OWD to Sartre's self-reproaches for the way that he involved Beauvoir in petty deceptions of other women, even wanting her to conceal from Tania, for instance, the greater number of letters and the larger proportion of his leave time allotted to Beauvoir. What exactly ougbt we to think of his practice of confiding in her the details of bis emotional response to otber women and the vicissitudes of bis affairs witb them'? Is it honesty or insensitivity1 Botb, of course. But I think a bit more needs to be said.
Waiting anxiously to bear Beauvoir's judgement on bis action in the Martinerrania affair, Sartre writes, I have the feeling that this whole period will be settled, ntified, interred only when we two will have been able to talk it over. It'l neceasary for you to What was tbe reality behind tbe lover's declarations: "You are my conscience, my other self"; "Togetber we make one",?
This was a relation between subjects, of course, not a merging of subjectivities. Ithink I can see that in a special sense it was for Sartre Iike a relation with his own self or at least his second self. It was as though together tbey bad constructed a common ego, though not to tbe exclusion of their separate egos, a projection of a crystallization of themselves that each was wilIing to support. In each person there was a trust in tbe other consciousness great enough to insure tbat any new view it might offer deserved to be considered a revelation of a true aspect of tbe world and the feeling that the otber person could be counted on to protect one against the risk of falling iota bad faitb, could do so by offering, as it were, one's own unclouded vision.
It is exactly in one's relations with oneself that bad faith arises, and Sartre records in the Diaries an occasion when his appeal to his "moral consciousness" was recognizably in bad faith. He wanted to apply for a Populist literary prize, for the sake of the money, but feit uncomfortable about doing so since,he did not favor the Populist party and disapproved of prizes on principle. Therefore he wrote to Beauvoir, knowing that she would tell him to try for the two thousand francs and that he would do so. It all bappened as he predicted, but Sartre recognized that he had in effect substituted her judgement for his own; reproached himself even as he wrote out the seventeen copies ofthe letter of application. We are reminded of Sartre's remarks, in the lecture on existentialism as a humanism, conceming the young man who came to him for advice, carefully selecting the person he hoped would give the advice he wanted.
Most of the time, however, I believe that Sartre's relationship with Beauvoir did exemplify authentie love, or love in good faith. I find in it the qualities which I have myself always thought to be the positive possibilities for human relations in Sartrean terms, and wbich can be expressed by expending Sartre's metaphor of the Look-the Look as exchange, in which each one not only seeks to know and to respect the structures of the other's private world, but to modify and enrich the structures of one's own in response; and the looking-together-at-the-world, whieh is the personal equivalent of Sartre's notion of common praxis in the Crit;que. The extant Diaries eontain no theoretical discussion of authentie love or of human relations in good faith. One has to wait for the Cashiers pour une morale for Sartre's explorations of reciprocity and empathy.
One other antieipatory note is sounded if we look at the Diar;es as a prelude. This is the ideal of transparency, wbieh Sartre reintroduced only in the interviews of bis last decade. It finally became for him the aim of a resocialization of such a kind that nobody would ever, out of fear or some other inhibiting force, feel the need to hold secrets. In the Diar;es he speaks of it as the factuality of his life as a student when he lived "publicly as a eouple," not only with Castor, its highest fulfillment, but also in friendship with Nizan and one or two others. Existence in such transparency was an "Olympian security, " and "an overwhelming happiness-like summer." (C, pp. 331-332. WD.
273-274)
Yet the Sartre of the Diaries worries lest bis ability to live without secrets and to lead others to do the same might stern from bis own too great pride in feeling no solidarity with his self, a detaehment that manifested itself too often in a lack of warmth. Be that as it may, I think his predilection for this transparency explains his almost total lack of reticence with respect to himself, botb in the letters to Beauvoir and in the Diaries. Sartre says that he treated his feelings Iike ideas and pushed them as far as they would go in order to explore and to understand the possibilities within them. On prineiple he believedthat "a man as not meant to look at himself but should always keep his eyes fixed ahead." (C, pp. 175. WD. p. 139) By exeeption he devoted the months of late
